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1.
Front Public Health ; 11: 1142602, 2023.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-2319141

ABSTRACT

Introduction: After the initial onset of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, the government of Canada and provincial health authorities imposed restrictive policies to limit virus transmission and mitigate disease burden. In this study, the pandemic implications in the Canadian province of Nova Scotia (NS) were evaluated as a function of the movement of people and governmental restrictions during successive SARS-CoV-2 variant waves (i.e., Alpha through Omicron). Methods: Publicly available data obtained from community mobility reports (Google), the Bank of Canada Stringency Index, the "COVID-19 Tracker" service, including cases, hospitalizations, deaths, and vaccines, population mobility trends, and governmental response data were used to relate the effectiveness of policies in controlling movement and containing multiple waves of SARS-CoV-2. Results: Our results indicate that the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic inflicted low burden in NS in the initial 2 years of the pandemic. In this period, we identified reduced mobility patterns in the population. We also observed a negative correlation between public transport (-0.78), workplace (-0.69), retail and recreation (-0.68) and governmental restrictions, indicating a tight governmental control of these movement patterns. During the initial 2 years, governmental restrictions were high and the movement of people low, characterizing a 'seek-and-destroy' approach. Following this phase, the highly transmissible Omicron (B.1.1.529) variant began circulating in NS at the end of the second year, leading to increased cases, hospitalizations, and deaths. During this Omicron period, unsustainable governmental restrictions and waning public adherence led to increased population mobility, despite increased transmissibility (26.41-fold increase) and lethality (9.62-fold increase) of the novel variant. Discussion: These findings suggest that the low initial burden caused by the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic was likely a result of enhanced restrictions to contain the movement of people and consequently, the spread of the disease. Easing public health restrictions (as measured by a decline in the BOC index) during periods of high transmissibility of circulating COVID-19 variants contributed to community spread, despite high levels of immunization in NS.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 , SARS-CoV-2 , Humans , Nova Scotia/epidemiology , COVID-19/epidemiology , COVID-19/prevention & control , Communicable Disease Control
2.
J Infect Dev Ctries ; 16(7): 1122-1125, 2022 07 28.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1974974

ABSTRACT

Mutations in the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) genome continue to threaten the global landscape of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. The Omicron variant (B.1.1.529) rapidly displaced previous 'variants of concern' (VoC) in 2021 due to its high rate of transmissibility and multitude of mutations. This global influx of infections saturated healthcare systems, overwhelmed testing capacity and case reporting, and increased the COVID-19 death toll. Global health leaders are now being faced with the most transmissible COVID-19 variants yet, the Omicron sublineages BA.4 and BA.5, which contain additional spike protein (S) mutations from previous Omicron and VoC serotypes. With universally observed antibody waning, increasing vaccine-variant mismatch, and resuming international travel, the stage is set for unprecedented levels of breakthrough infections and superspreading events. In this paper, we raise awareness to these novel variants and provide context for the high likelihood of an upcoming wave of infection capable of inflicting significant disease burden on a global scale.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 , Viral Vaccines , Antibodies, Viral , Humans , SARS-CoV-2/genetics
3.
J Infect Dev Ctries ; 14(1): 3-17, 2020 01 31.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1512

ABSTRACT

On 31 December 2019 the Wuhan Health Commission reported a cluster of atypical pneumonia cases that was linked to a wet market in the city of Wuhan, China. The first patients began experiencing symptoms of illness in mid-December 2019. Clinical isolates were found to contain a novel coronavirus with similarity to bat coronaviruses. As of 28 January 2020, there are in excess of 4,500 laboratory-confirmed cases, with > 100 known deaths. As with the SARS-CoV, infections in children appear to be rare. Travel-related cases have been confirmed in multiple countries and regions outside mainland China including Germany, France, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Canada, and the United States, as well as Hong Kong and Taiwan. Domestically in China, the virus has also been noted in several cities and provinces with cases in all but one provinence. While zoonotic transmission appears to be the original source of infections, the most alarming development is that human-to-human transmission is now prevelant. Of particular concern is that many healthcare workers have been infected in the current epidemic. There are several critical clinical questions that need to be resolved, including how efficient is human-to-human transmission? What is the animal reservoir? Is there an intermediate animal reservoir? Do the vaccines generated to the SARS-CoV or MERS-CoV or their proteins offer protection against 2019-nCoV? We offer a research perspective on the next steps for the generation of vaccines. We also present data on the use of in silico docking in gaining insight into 2019-nCoV Spike-receptor binding to aid in therapeutic development. Diagnostic PCR protocols can be found at https://www.who.int/health-topics/coronavirus/laboratory-diagnostics-for-novel-coronavirus.


Subject(s)
Betacoronavirus , Coronavirus Infections/transmission , Disease Reservoirs/veterinary , Disease Transmission, Infectious , Pneumonia, Viral/transmission , Animals , Betacoronavirus/genetics , COVID-19 , COVID-19 Vaccines , Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology , Coronavirus Infections/prevention & control , Coronavirus Infections/virology , Disease Reservoirs/virology , Humans , Pandemics , Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology , Pneumonia, Viral/virology , SARS-CoV-2 , Sequence Analysis, Protein , Travel , Vaccination , Viral Proteins/chemistry , Viral Proteins/genetics , Viral Vaccines , Zoonoses
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